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The Non-Board Settlement
Agreement: An Analysis of the
Power of the General
Counsel to Reinstate a
Withdrawn Charge
Ronald L. Mason*t
The NationalLabor Relations Board has a longstandingpolicy of encouraging
the settlement of meritoriousunfairlaborpracticecharges and honoringtheformal
and informalagreements which it has approved Moreover, a case is not closedjollowing the Regional Director's approval of the settlement and withdrawal of the
charge. The Boardmay set aside such an agreement andreinstatethe charge. This
Article reviews the case law relatingto the setting asideofformaland informalsettlement agreements andaddressesthe standardthat the Boardshould employ in determining whether a RegionalDirectorshould be permittedto go behind a non-Board
settlement agreement and reinstate a withdrawn charge. The Article criticaly analyzes the contrarypositionsof this issue taken by the Courts ofAppealsfor the Fifth
and Sixth Circuitsand concludes that the Ffth Circuit'sapproach, which requires
the Board to find that a chargedparty either breachedthe terms of the non-Board
settlement agreement or committed a subsequent unfair laborpractice,is superior.

INTRODUCTION

THE National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has a longstanding policy of encouraging the settlement of meritorious
unfair labor practice charges' which has resulted in an unprecedented number of settlements.2 John Irving, a former Board Gen* B.A. Ohio Dominican College; J.D. University of Dayton Law School; L.L.M.
Georgetown University Law Center. The author is associated with the Office of the General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, and the opinions of the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Office of the General Counsel.
t The author would like to thank Barbara Rae Macce, Esq. for her support and
encouragement.
I. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1944); 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 20-22
(1938); 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 15-17 (1937); 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 30-31 (1936). In an effort to
more fully implement this prosettlement policy, the General Counsel has placed at least
one "settlement coordinator" in each regional office to monitor every case set for trial and
to ensure that a substantial effort is made to settle the charges. Irving, Do We Needa Labor
Board?, 30 LAB. UJ. 387 (1979).
2. In fiscal year 1979, the Board processed a record filing of 41,259 unfair labor practice charges. The Regional Directors dismissed 35.3% of thes6 charges and the charging
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eral Counsel, considers the continuation of this high settlement
rate to be of paramount importance3 to the Board's ability to ef-

fectuate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act).4 Although the Board encourages its Regional Directors to
enter into formal, informal, oral, and non-Board settlement agreements, the formal and informal agreements are the most difficult

to obtain.' Thus, the policy of encouraging settlement must include strong support for the disposition of meritorious charges
through non-Board and oral agreements. In exploring the content
of the various settlement agreements and the ability of the Board
to set aside the agreements, greater insight into the prosettlement

policy can be obtained.
A formal settlement is a written agreement between the Board
and the charged party which requires the charged party to remedy

its unfair labor practices through specific actions. The agreement
parties withdrew 30.4% of the charges before complaints were issued. Of the remaining
meritorious charges, 84.5% were settled. 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 1, 2-3, 5 (Chart No. 3)
(1979).
3. Memorandum 79-41 from General Counsel Irving to Regional Directors, reprinted
in 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9164 (July 6, 1978), in which General Counsel Irving stated:
The Regions have already demonstrated their ability to maintain a high rate
of settlement, even when confronted with unusual settlement problems, and I am
confident that as the Regions renew their settlement efforts in the coming months,
the Agency will again achieve a high rate of settlement which is necessary for the
timely remedying and adjustment of meritorious unfair labor practice cases.
Id.
In Memorandum 80-61 from Associate General Counsel to Regional Directors, the
Regional Directors were informed that the General Counsel, William A. Lubbers, had
written all members of the American Bar Association's Labor Law Section requesting the
labor bar's help in settling pending cases before the NLRB. The Regional Directors were
instructed "to follow up on the General Counsel's letter by contacting respondents with
renewed settlement efforts in pending cases." Letter from Joseph E. DiSio, Associate General Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (Nov.
25, 1980).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). If the settlement rate were to drop below 80%, the
effectiveness of the Board would be jeopardized seriously and a "crisis" in labor law enforcement would result. Irving, supra note 1, at 391.
5. Charged parties entered into a total of 10,401 settlements in fiscal year 1979. Only
175 of these settlements were formal and only 3,555 were informal settlement agreements.
The remaining 6,671 settlements were either non-Board or oral settlements. These figures
were obtained from a telephone interview with Milford Cleveland, Office of the General
Counsel, Division of Operations Management, National Labor Relations Board, Washington D.C.
6. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CASE HANDLING MANUAL, pt. 1, § 10164.1
(April 1975) [hereinafter cited as NLRB CASE HANDLING MANUAL] provides:
A formal settlement is a written stipulation calling for remedial action in adjustment of unfair labor practices and providing that, upon approval by the
Board, a Board order in conformity with its terms will issue. Ordinarily it will
also provide for the consent entry of a court judgment enforcing the order.
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must be approved by the Board members who then issue an appropriate order to conform with the terms of the agreement. 7 A
consent entry of a court decision enforcing the order generally
must be included in the formal settlement agreement. 8 The stringent nature of these requirements often deters the charged party
from entering into a formal agreement.9 The same result, after all,
would be reached if the party litigated the allegation in the charge,
lost before the Board, and, on appeal, a circuit court enforced the
Board's order. A charged party will be willing to enter into a formal settlement agreement, however, if the General Counsel has a
very strong case and a quick settlement would save the expense of
extensive litigation. In addition, a charged party can usually obtain a better order by negotiating on the Board's order than by
litigating the case before an administrative law judge.
An informal settlement agreement is also a written agreement
which requires the charged party to remedy its unfair labor practices through specifications. 1" Unlike the formal settlement agreement, however, only the Regional Director, and not the entire
Board, is a party to the agreement.1 Additionally, since an informal settlement agreement does not require Board approval, there
is neither a Board order issued directing the parties to conform to
the terms of the agreement nor a court decision to enforce the
Board's order.'2 As a result of these less stringent conditions, the
Regional Director may be more flexible in negotiating the exact
terms of the informal settlement agreement. Furthermore, the Director is prohibited from going to federal court to seek a contempt
order if the charged party commits a subsequent unfair labor
practice. Thus, a charged party is more amenable to entering into
an informal agreement than a formal settlement agreement.
In contrast, the General Counsel defines a non-Board settlement as one in which the charging party and the charged party
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. See note 5 supra.
10. NLRB CASE HANDLING MANUAL, supra note 6, § 10146.1, provides:

An informal settlement agreement is a simple written agreement, providing
that the charged party will take certain action in remedy of the unfair labor practices. It requires the approval of the Regional Director but does not provide for a
Board order or court decree.
In considering whether to approve an informal settlement, the Regional Di-

rector should take into consideration whether there is a history of unfair labor
practices by the same charged party.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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reach an agreement between themselves.' 3 Such an agreement,

however, does not necessarily represent the final disposition of the
case. Even though the charging party may have requested a withdrawal of the charge, the Regional Director can deny the request,

proceed with the investigation, and potentially issue a complaint.

4

When a charging party is not represented by counsel or a

union, the Regional Director reviews the terms of the agreement
to determine whether "it is repugnant to the purposes of the Act"

15
or reflects overreaching by one of the parties in the negotiations.

Despite the obstacles faced in reaching a non-Board settle-

ment, it is nevertheless the preferable agreement for charged parties. This type of settlement allows a charged party to negotiate
with the charging party to obtain a less comprehensive agreement
than that which the Regional Director would mandate. By entering into such an agreement, the charged party also can avoid the

expense of litigation.
The non-Board agreement is also preferable for charging par13. Id. § 10142 provides:
On occasion during the course of the investigation, Board personnel may be
asked, by one or more of the parties to a case, whether they may meet directly
with each other "to work out a mutually satisfactory solution." (On other occasions, they may meet without consultation with the Region.) The official attitude
of the Region should be that it would not, if it could, prevent the parties from
ironing out their difficulties privately. However-and this is particularly important where rights of individuals are involved-the inquiring party should be informed that any arrangement thus reached will not necessarily be recognized by
the Board as disposing of the case. Investigation will continue. Should the Re-

gion be notified that a "private settlement" has been reached and that the charging party wants the case dropped (either in such language or by submitting a

withdrawal request) the terms of the "settlement" should be procured if possible.
The approval of the withdrawal request should then be granted or withheld in
accordance with criteria laid down in [section] 10120. In those situations where
individual discriminatees are not represented by counsel or a union, caution
should be exercised to insure that the non-Board settlement is not repugnant to
the purposes of the Act or that an individual has not been taken advantage of in
the private negotiations.
If approval is withheld, the parties should be so notified, and investigation
should continue.
If approval is granted, the case may or may not be closed as adusted. The
case should be closed as adjusted if the terms of the "settlement," while not constituting the full remedy which appears to be called for, provide for a substantial
part of the remedy and are all consistent with the purposes of the Act. It should
not be closed as adjusted if this standard is not met--it should be closed if withdrawn "because charging party does not wish to proceed."
In no such case should the parties be notified that the "settlement" has the
approval of the Board. They should be sent the usual withdrawal request approval letter.
14. See NLRB v. Sebastopol Apple Growers Union, 269 F.2d 705, 706-07 (9th Cir.
1959); Community Medical Services of Clearfield, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 853 (1978); Jack C.
Robinson, 117 N.L.R.B. 1483 (1957).
15. NLRB CAsE HANDLING MANUAL, supra note 6, § 10142.
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ties. An unlawfully discharged individual, for example, may be
willing to settle for far less back pay in exchange for immediate
reinstatement rights or for a cash payment in exchange for a
waiver of those reinstatement rights. Full back pay and reinstatement rights which can be obtained only after several years of litigation or settlement negotiations may be an insufficient remedy
for a person who is unemployed during that period. Thus, the
non-Board settlement agreement may provide the individual with
the more favorable remedy of quick relief.
When the Regional Director approves a withdrawal request
made pursuant to a non-Board settlement agreement, the Director
makes a judgment concerning whether the case should be reported
as "adjusted" or withdrawn "because the charging party does not
wish to proceed."' 6 The case will be closed as "adjusted" only7
when the settlement includes a substantial part of the remedy
which is required.
In contrast to the formal, informal, and non-Board settlement
agreements, the General Counsel defines an oral settlement as an
actual settlement in which the charged party takes remedial action
at the request of the Regional Director to remedy alleged unfair
labor practices but is unwilling to enter into a written settlement
agreement or to acknowledge by posted notice that the remedial
action was taken because of the settlement of a charge.'" If the
Regional Director finds that the remedial action provides a sub16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 10144, provides:

A charged party may, on occasion, take remedial action as proposed by a
Regional Director without, however, being willing to enter into a written settle-

ment agreement or to acknowledge by a posted notice that the action is being
taken pursuant to settlement of a charge. (Examples: Interrupted bargaining negotiations may be resumed; a dischargee may be offered reinstatement with

backpay; a union may cease striking for an illegal form of union security.)
Where such action is accompanied by a voluntary withdrawal request for the

charging party, approval of the request should ordinarily be granted. The case
may be closed as adjusted, but the parties should not be notified that the remedial

action has the imprimatur of the Board. They should be sent the usual withdrawal request approval letter.
Where the action is not accompanied by a withdrawal request where, in fact,
the charging party is not satisfied that the action taken remedies the unfair labor
practices, the Regional Director must determine whether effectuation of the purposes of the Act calls for further proceedings. Normally, if the action taken is a
full or substantial remedy in fact, if there is no history of prior similar practices by
the same charged party, and if there is no likelihood of recurrence, the charge
should be dismissed on the ground that effectuation of the purposes of the Act
does not warrant further proceedings. ...
The case, when closed, should be considered adjusted and so reported to

Washington.

514
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stantial remedy, that the charged party has no history of similar
practices, and that there is no likelihood of a recurrence of the
present practice, the Regional Director will approve a withdrawal request.' If the charging party does not make a withdrawal
request, the Regional Director will dismiss the charge on the
grounds that further proceedings would not effectuate the purposes of the Act.20 This type of settlement generally involves minor violations of the Act that are remedied by informing the
charged party that its actions violate the Act and by eliciting a
commitment from the charged party that it will obey the law.
Oral settlements have not been the subject of any significant
litigation.
The Board's involvement with the case does not automatically
cease when the parties enter into one of the four types of settlement agreements and the Regional Director approves the withdrawal of the charge. The Board must decide under what conditions it may set aside the settlement agreement and reinstate the
charge. When a formal or informal settlement agreement is at issue, the Board polices compliance with that agreement, the charge
is not withdrawn but becomes dormant, and the case remains
open.2 Furthermore, the law is settled on the proper test that the
Board should use to set aside a formal settlement agreement,'
and this test has been applied without any hesitation to the setting
aside of an informal settlement agreement.23 The law, however, is
not settled on when the Board can reinstate a withdrawn charge
pursuant to a non-Board settlement agreement.24 The two circuit
courts that have directly addressed the issue disagree over what
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. § 10140.1.
22. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
23. NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 925, 460 F.2d 589 (5th
Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Hod Carriers Local 185, 389 F.2d 721
(9th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Local 269, IBEW, 357 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1966).
24. The Board has taken the position that the General Counsel has unlimited discretion to proceed once a charge has been filed. This discretion includes the power to reinstate
a withdrawn charge. Silver Bakery Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 421, 424 (1964). In addition, if a

charging party is dissatisfied with the terms of the non-Board settlement agreement, the
party has the right to file a second charge alleging the same conduct as the charge that was
withdrawn. John F. Cuneo Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 929 (1965). In either case, the Regional
Director must determine whether to go behind a non-Board settlement agreement. But see
note 82 infra, concerning the problem of the six month statute of limitations on reinstatement of the withdrawn charge by the Regional Director or on the filing of a second charge
more than six months after the alleged unlawful conduct occurred.
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test, if any, must be met before the Board can go behind 25 the
terms of a non-Board settlement agreement and find that the
charged party's conduct violated the Act.
This Article reviews the case law on setting aside formal and
informal settlement agreements2 6 and examines the standard the
Board and the courts should use in deciding whether a Regional
Director should be permitted to go behind a non-Board settlement
agreement and reinstate a withdrawn charge.
I.

SETTING ASIDE FORMAL AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS

The Board consistently has taken the position that it will
honor a formal settlement agreement which it has approved. 28
The Board also consistently has set aside an approved formal settlement agreement and reinstated a charge when the charged
party either failed to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement or committed a subsequent unfair labor practice. 29
The Supreme Court addressed the Board's authority to disregard a previously approved settlement agreement and to reinstate
a withdrawn charge in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB. ° In Wallace, a
local C.I.O. union filed a charge alleging that the company had
sponsored the formation of an independent union in violation of
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.31 As a result of this charge and
subsequent investigation by the Board, all parties to the charge
drafted and executed two formal settlement agreements. The Regional Director signed both agreements on behalf of the Board.
One agreement provided that the C.I.O. union would withdraw its
charge concerning alleged company domination of the independ25. Because the Regional Director is not a party to the agreement, there is no need to
set aside a non-Board settlement agreement. The phrase "go behind" is used to indicate

the Regional Director's disregard of the non-Board settlement agreement.
26. See notes 27-56 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 57-102 infra and accompanying text. The issue of going behind an oral

settlement is not addressed because the use of oral settlements is not widespread and any
discussion of a non-Board settlement agreement would be applicable by analogy to an oral
settlement agreement.
28. Corn Products Refining Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 824, 828-29 (1940); Wickwire Bros., 16
N.L.LB. 316, 325-26 (1939); Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 12 N.L.R.B. 568, 576-79 (1939);
Shenandoah-Dives Mining Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 885, 888 (1939).
29. Locomotive Finished Material Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 922, 927 (1943); Chicago Casket

Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 235, 252-56 (1940); Harry A. Halff, 16 N.L.R.B. 667, 679-82 (1939).
30. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976).
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ent union. The second agreement provided for a consent election
to be held between the C.I.O. and independent unions.
After the independent union won the consent election and the
Board certified it as the exclusive bargaining agent, the company
negotiated a contract with the independent union. The union security clause provided for a "closed shop," requiring all present
and future employees in the bargaining unit to join the independent union.32 Subsequently, the independent union refused to allow some of the bargaining unit's employees, who were members
of the C.I.O. union, to join the independent union. The independent union then demanded that the company discharge all employees who were not members of its union. The company, as a result,
discharged forty-three employees.33
The C.I.O. union filed a second charge with the Board concerning the discharges of the forty-three employees. This subsequent unfair labor practice charge prompted the Regional
Director to set aside the formal settlement agreement and reinstate
the original charge.
The Board found that the company committed no unfair labor
practices between the time it entered into the two formal settlement agreements concerning the first charge and the time of the
consent election resulting from those agreements. 34 The Board
further found that the company sufficiently violated the second
charge, alleging unlawful discharges, to set aside the formal settlement agreements and reinstate the original charge alleging the
company's domination of the independent union.35 The Board
found, as a result of the reinstatement of the second charge, that
the company dominated the independent union36 and ordered the
company to "cease giving effect to any contract" between the com37
pany and the independent union.
The company argued before the Court that the Board was estopped from setting aside the agreements and reinstating the
union-domination charge. In rejecting this argument, the Court
stated:
With reference to the attempted settlement of disputes, as in the
performance of other duties imposed upon it by the Act, the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

323 U.S. at 250.
Id.
Wallace Corp., 50 N.L.R.B. 138, 154 (1943).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 156.
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Board has power to fashion its procedure to achieve the Act's
purpose to protect employees from unfair labor practices. We
cannot, by incorporating the judicial concept of estoppel into its
to prevent an obvious
procedure, render the Board powerless
38
frustration of the Act's purposes.

The Court considered it to be the Board's duty to take "fresh steps
to prevent frustration of the Act"' 39 when the purpose of a settlement agreement was defeated. The Court noted that the Board
had adopted a working rule that would allow the Board to set
aside a settlement agreement and reinstate a charge only when
either the agreement had failed to accomplish its purpose or when
there had been a subsequent unfair labor practice. Thus, in Wallace, the Court found this rule to be "appropriate to accomplish
the Act's purpose with fairness to all concerned. 40
The Court's recognition that the Board has broad powers "to
fashion its procedure to achieve the Act's purpose to protect employees from unfair labor practices" 4 ' demonstrates the sweeping
power granted to many administrative agencies. Over the years,
the courts generally have held that administrative agencies should
be free to fashion their own rules of procedure to discharge their
duties. 42 This freedom, however, is not unlimited and cannot exceed the statutory authority of the administrative agency's enabling legislation.43 Wallace is not the only case in which a court
has held that equitable estoppel does not apply to an administrative agency. 44 Similarly, courts have held that the doctrine of res
judicata has no application to the action of an administrative
agency.45 Apart from the most basic pleadings which are required
prior to a hearing before an administrative agency, the technical
rules of evidence that are applicable to civil trials are not strictly
38. 323 U.S. at 253.
39. Id. at 254.
40. Id. at 255.
41. Id. at 253.
42. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544 (1978); FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965).
43. Flotill Products, Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224, 230 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc).
44. See, ag., NLRB v. My Store, Inc., 345 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1965); Churchill
Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
45. District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565, 568 (4th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1944). But see United States v. Utah Constr.
& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 395, 422 (1966) ("where administrative agency is acting in a judi-

cial capacity ... the courts have not hesitated to apply resjudicata to enforce repose")
(dictum).

CASE WESTERM RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3 1:509

observed.' The hearing examiner is given great latitude in all
phases of the hearing, including the manner in which it is
conducted.4 7
Given the courts' recognition of the broad powers of adminis-

trative agencies in general and the Supreme Court's recognition of
the Board's power to fashion its own remedies in particular, it is
not surprising to find that the Board and the circuit courts have

applied the Wallace test to set aside informal settlement agreements and reinstate withdrawn charges when the parties breached
the terms of the informal settlement4 8 or when the charged parties

committed further unfair labor practices. 49 This application of the
law established in Wallace is proper.
Since the Board is not always required to adhere toformal settlement agreements, the contention that the Board should always
adhere to informal settlement agreements because of public policy

considerations is not a convincing argument. It must be noted,
however, that the Regional Director is not required to set aside
either a formal settlement agreement or an informal settlement

agreement when a charged party has committed a subsequent unfair labor practice. In Metal Processors' Union Local No. 16 v.
NLRB, 0 the court stated that the Board has discretion to decide

when to set aside a settlement agreement. Even if a charged party
commits a subsequent unfair labor practice in violation of the Act,
the Board need only set aside a settlement agreement when the
subsequent conduct violates or frustrates the terms or purposes of
the settlement agreement. 5 ' The court concluded that it was in the

Board's discretion to make such a determination.
Under the Wallace decision, the Court has restricted the
Board to setting aside settlement agreements only when the terms
46. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948); Morton v. Dow, 525 F.2d
1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 1975); Fairbank v. Hardin, 429 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1970).
47. Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir.
1977).
48. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 925, 460 F.2d
589, 597 (5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 423 F.2d 878, 880 (5th Cir.
1970).
49. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 925, 460 F.2d at
597; NLRB v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 423 F.2d at 880, NLRB v. Construction & Gen.
Laborers Union Local 185, 389 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Local 269, IBEW,
357 F.2d 51, 56 (3d Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Dressmakers Joint Council, Int'l Ladies' Garment
Workers Union, 342 F.2d 988, 989 (2d Cir. 1965); Radiator Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 336
F.2d 495, 497 (4th Cir. 1964).
50. 337 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
51. Id. at 117 n.4.
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of the agreement are breached or when the charged party commits
subsequent unfair labor practices. The Court simply approved the
current test adopted by the Board. Until the Board can justify
that going beyond the Wallace test is "appropriate to accomplish
the Act's purpose with fairness to all concerned,"5 2 the courts
should hold that a Regional Director cannot revoke approval of a
settlement agreement if its terms have not been frustrated by the
subsequent conduct of the charged party or if no subsequent unfair labor practice has been committed. 3
The Board has limited the time within which the Regional Director can set aside a settlement agreement. Such an agreement
can be set aside at the Regional Director's discretion only if the
subsequent conduct of the charged party occurred within a reasonable time after the settlement agreement was executed. 54 The
Board, for example, has found it reasonable for a Regional Director to set aside a settlement agreement that was executed fourteen
months before the charged party committed a subsequent violation. 5 Currently, there is no clear standard defining a reasonable
time after which a Regional Director can no longer set aside a
settlement agreement. The Board, however, has indicated that it
recognizes a time
limit after which a settlement agreement will not
56
disturbed.
be
II.

GOING BEHIND A NON-BOARD SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

If there is not a strong policy argument to support the proposition that the Board should adhere to an informal settlement agreement because the Board is not required to adhere to a formal
settlement agreement, then the argument that the Board should
adhere to, or at least respect the terms of, a non-Board settlement
agreement is even weaker.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first
52. Wallace Corp. v.NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944).
53. See NLRB v. Bangor Plastics, Inc., 392 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1967), in which the
court refused to set aside an informal settlement agreement after finding that the charged
party did not breach the terms of the settlement agreement or commit further unfair labor
practices. See also Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 192 N.L.R.B. 338 (1971), in which the Board
held that a subsequent independent violation of the Act was unrelated to the matters and
conduct of a settlement agreement and did not warrant the setting aside of the settlement
agreement.
54. Utrad Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 434, 441 (1970).
55. Sheet Metal Workers Local 80, 236 N.L.R.B. 41, 42 (1978).
56. Cf. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (1979) (three prior violations committed during a period of six to fourteen years before the instant charge did not
warrant the issuance of a broad remedial order).
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addressed the issue of the propriety of the Board going behind a
non-Board settlement agreement. In NLRB v. SuperiorTool & Die
Co., the company and the union entered into a strike-settlement
agreement which provided that the union would withdraw a
charge it had filed with the Board. The union, believing that the
company had breached the terms of the strike-settlement agreement because it discharged two employees, filed a second charge
against the company. The Trial Examiner found that the company had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging these employees. The Board then affirmed this decision.
The Trial Examiner, citing Wallace, went behind the strikesettlement agreement because the post-settlement conduct of the
company defeated the main object of that agreement-the reinstatement of all strikers. The Trial Examiner found that the company's presettlement conduct violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Board, without adopting the Trial Examiner's view of the effect of a strike-settlement agreement, stated that going behind the
that the company's presetagreement was appropriate and found
58
Act.
the
violated
conduct
tlement
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concurred with the Trial Examiner's opinion. Even though the Board's policy is not to revive old
charges voluntarily settled, 9 the court concluded that when postsettlement misconduct frustrates the policy, it is proper to go behind the settlement agreement to consider events that occurred
prior to the settlement.6" Although the court cited Wallace as authority, it found that the company did not violate sections 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act by discharging the two employees. By refusing
to find the company in violation of the Act, the Sixth Circuit followed Wallace to its logical conclusion: the court will not set
aside a formal or an informal settlement agreement without finding that the charged party either breached the terms of the settlement agreement or committed a subsequent unfair labor
practice. 6 '
Two years after Superior Tool, the Sixth Circuit again addressed this issue in NLRB v. Zimnox Coal Co. 62 In Zimnox, a
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

309
132
See
See
See
336

F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1962), denying enforcement to 132 N.L.R.B. 1373 (1961).
N.L.R.B. at 1373 n.l.
note 25 supra.
note 27 supra.
note 53 supra for additional support for this conclusion.
F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1964), enforcing in pertinentpart 140 N.L.R1B. 1229 (1963).
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previously filed charge 63 was withdrawn with the Regional Director's approval after the company and the union reached a nonBoard settlement agreement. The settlement provided that in exchange for requesting withdrawal of the union's charge, the company would agree to a consent election. After the union won the
election, it reified the previously withdrawn charge. The company
argued that the Board was estopped from proceeding on the
charge because the subject matter of that charge had been settled
in a non-Board settlement agreement between the company and
the union. Furthermore, the second charge did not allege that the
company had breached the terms of the non-Board settlement
agreement or that the company had engaged in any post-election
conduct that amounted to an unfair labor practice.
The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's decision in Zimnox
without comment. The Trial Examiner denied the defense of the
non-Board settlement agreement stating that the agreement was a
private one, limited to the withdrawal of the pending charge so
that an election could be held.' Moreover, the non-Board settlement agreement did not state in writing that the charge was to be
withdrawn with prejudice.65 Thus, the Trial Examiner allowed
that charge to stand.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the union's refiling of
the settled charge was obviously in retaliation for the company's
refusal to accede to a post-election union demand. Nevertheless,
the court averred that the Act did not forbid this type of action
and that the "primary responsibility for preventing the revival of
settled charges as a bargaining bludgeon must remain with the
Regional Directors and the General Counsel. 66
In NLRB v. Lasko MetalProducts,Inc.,67 the Sixth Circuit reiterated its position in Zimnox that the Regional Director has
broad discretion to permit the refiling of a charge even though the
allegations in the charge are the subject of a non-Board settlement
63. The Sixth Circuit was incorrect when it stated in its opinion that a complaint was
withdrawn by the union with the Regional Director's approval. The Trial Examiner's decision established that it was a charge that was withdrawn with the approval of the Regional
Director and not a complaint. Zimnox Coal Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1229, 1233 n.12, 1237

(1963).
64. Id. at 1237.
65. The Trial Examiner stated that if the company believed that the withdrawal of the

charge was with prejudice, then the company's attorney should have insisted that this understanding be reduced to writing. Id. at 1237 n.22.
66. NLRB v. Zimnox Coal Co., 336 F.2d 516, 517 (6th Cir. 1964).
67. 363 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1966), enforcing 148 N.L.R.B. 976 (1964).
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agreement. In Lasko, the Board found that the company had
committed no unfair labor practices subsequent to the time when
the company entered into the non-Board settlement agreement
with the union. The Board went behind the non-Board settlement
agreement, however, and found that the company had violated
section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board did not discuss the nonBoard settlement agreement.68 Rather, it adopted the findings of
the Trial Examiner concerning the section 8(a)(1) violation. The
Trial Examiner found that he could go behind the settlement
agreement and find a violation of the Act for three reasons: (1)
the settlement agreement was entered into without the participation of the Regional Director, thus, the unfair labor practice was
without a remedy; (2) the withdrawal of the charge was without
prejudice; and (3) the company engaged in further violations of
section 8(a)(1) after it had entered into the non-Board settlement
agreement. 69
While the last of the three reasons given by the Trial Examiner
was sufficient under Wallace to go behind the non-Board settlement agreement and find a violation of the Act, the Sixth Circuit
found the first two reasons equally sufficient. The court stated
that the policy against reviving charges that had been settled voluntarily7° was not to be interpreted as prohibiting the Regional
Director from reviving old charges when a voluntary agreement,
to which the Board was not a party, collapsed. The court then
granted enforcement of the Board's order.
In both Zimnox and Lasko, the Board and the Sixth Circuit
have disregarded well established case law and concluded that the
Regional Director and the General Counsel have unbridled discretion. Under these decisions, the Board can issue a complaint
on a refiled charge that originally was withdrawn with the approval of the Regional Director, even though the charge was already the subject of a non-Board settlement agreement. Both the
68. The Board has discussed this issue in John F. Cuneo Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 929 (1965),
where the Board, in reference to subsequent charges that were filed concerning the conduct
by the employer that was settled in a non-Board settlement agreement, stated: "[A]ny
agreement which the Respondent and the Union may have entered into and which resulted

in the withdrawal of these prior charges was a private arrangement which does not estop
the Board to proceed on any new charges alleging the same conduct as the withdrawn
charges." Id. at 931 n.4. See also DeTray Plating Works, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 1353, 1360
(1965) (Board adopted Trial Examiner's recommendation that DeTray cease and desist

from discouraging membership in Union, interrogating employees about their union activities, and interfering with employees' right to join union).
69. Lasko Metal Products, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 976, 991 (1964).
70. See note 28 supra.
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Board and the Sixth Circuit, however, have ignored a significant
public policy argument. Without subsequent conduct on the part
of the charged party constituting either a violation of the terms of
the agreement or unlawful conduct, the charged party has a right
to expect that the other party will abide by the terms of the
agreement.
The Regional Directors' time, therefore, is better spent addressing the meritorious charges that have not been settled than
contributing to the backlog of cases by issuing complaints on
charges that already have been settled by the parties. The Sixth
Circuit's decision in Superior Tool is inconsistent with Zimnox
and Lasko. In Superior Tool, the court refused to go behind a
strike-settlement agreement because the Regional Director failed
to demonstrate that the charged party either breached the terms of
71
the agreement or committed a subsequent unfair labor practice.
In both Zimnox and Lasko, the court appears to have ignored its
reasoning in Superior Tool by holding that the General Counsel
and the Regional Directors have absolute discretion to disregard a
non-Board settlement agreement even though the charged party
neither breached the terms of the agreement nor committed a subsequent unfair labor practice.
Perhaps greater insight into the rationale of the Sixth Circuit
can be obtained through a comparison with the approach the
Fifth Circuit has taken on setting aside a non-Board settlement
agreement. Recently, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the Regional Director can go behind a non-Board settlement agreement and reinstate a charge that was withdrawn with
approval when the charged party had neither breached the terms
of the agreement nor committed a subsequent unfair labor practice. In Gulf States Manufacturers,Inc.,72 the Board considered a
case in which a non-Board settlement agreement between the
company and the union was entered into after the union filed a
charge with the Board alleging that the company violated sections
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. A second charge was filed within six
months of the alleged violation which alleged that the company
violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act 73 but which did
not contain any specific allegations that were included in the first
charge other than the usual, broad "catch all" language.74 After
71. NLRB v. Superior Tool & Die Co., 309 F.2d at 695.

72. 230 N.L.R.B. 558 (1977).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (5) (1976).
74. "By these and other acts, the above-named employer has interfered with, re-
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more than six months had passed from the date that the first
charge allegedly occurred, the Regional Director sought to amend
the complaint issued on the second charge and to reinstate the
allegations contained in the first charge that were the subject of a
non-Board settlement agreement. The company contended that
the reinstatement of the withdrawn charge abused the Regional
Director's discretion and that on the basis of public policy, this
type of reinstatement would discourage voluntary settlements.
The company also argued that the reinstatement was time barred
under section 10(b) of the Act.7 5
The Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's decision
without comment, holding that the "catch all" language used in
the second charge was broad enough to include the allegations
contained in the first charge. The judge stated that the reinstatement of a withdrawn charge by the Regional Director was not an
abuse of discretion because the Regional Director was not a party
to the agreement and because a private agreement does not estop
the Board from proceeding on any new charges which allege the
same conduct as the withdrawn charge.76 The reinstatement of
the first charge, however, was time barred under section 10(b) of
the Act because the Regional Director sought to amend the second charge more than six months after the alleged violation occurred in the first charge.
The Fifth Circuit in 6u/f States Manufacturers, Inc. v.
NLR., 7 7 held that reinstatement of the first charge was prohibited and that the union was estopped from making allegations in a
later charge that were the subject of the non-Board settlement
agreement since that agreement, entered into between the company and the union, provided for the withdrawal of the first
charge with prejudice.7 The court also held that the Board was
legally and morally bound to the agreement because the Regional
Director approved the withdrawal request submitted by the union.
strained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the

Act." 230 N.L.R.B. at 559 n.3.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[N]o complaint shall issue
based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of
the charge with the Board .
76. See note 68 supra.
77. 579 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1978).
78. Compare Gulf States Mfrs., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 558 (1977) with Zimnox Coal Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 1229 (1963). The Trial Examiner in Zinmox stated that if the company
wanted a charge withdrawn with prejudice it should have insisted that the understanding
be reduced to writing. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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The Fifth Circuit then granted a petition for rehearing,7 9
agreeing to reconsider Part I of its decision in Gulf States.8 ° The
court, sitting en banc in 6-u/f States Manufacturers, Inc. v.
NLRB,8 ' held that a Regional Director was authorized to reinstate a charge that previously had been withdrawn as part of a
non-Board settlement agreement when a party to the agreement
either breached the terms of the agreement or committed a subsequent unfair labor practice that was related to the non-Board settlement agreement. The court reversed the panel decision that the
union was estopped from alleging in a subsequent charge any conduct of a charged party that was the subject of a non-Board settlement agreement. Furthermore, the court no longer posited that
the Board was legally and morally bound to the non-Board settlement agreement because the Regional Director had approved the

withdrawal of the charge. In applying this new test, the Fifth Circuit held that the subsequent unfair labor practice charge did not
bear a "substantial relationship" to the non-Board settlement
agreement. The court, therefore, denied the Board's request for
the enforcement of that part of the Board's order.82
79. Gulf States Mfrs., Inc. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1978).
80. 579 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1978).
81. 598 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1979).
82. A § 10(b) issue can arise regarding a withdrawn charge in one of three different
situations: (1) The charging party seeks to refile a withdrawn charge more than six months
after the alleged unfair labor practice occurred; (2) The Regional Director seeks to reinstate
a withdrawn charge more than six months after the alleged unfair labor practice occurred;
or (3) A charging party seeks to refile or a Regional Director seeks to reinstate a charge
withdrawn pursuant to a non-Board settlement agreement more than six months after the
alleged unfair labor practice occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
When a charging party seeks to refile his charge, the events complained of must have
occurred within six months from the date the charge is refied and served. Hy-Lan Furniture, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 308 (1969). Once a charge is filed and withdrawn, however, and
the Regional Director seeks to reinstate the charge, the Board has taken the position that
the General Counsel has unlimited discretion to proceed on the reinstated charge. In Silver Bakery, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 421 (1964), the Board stated:
In our opinion, Section 10(b) relates only to the actual filing of charges.... [I]t
is clear that the General Counsel acting in the public interest to effectuate the
policies of the Act has virtually unlimited discretion to proceed on charges as he
deems fit in the exercise of his office. And there is nothing in the Act limiting his
authority to issue a complaint once a charge is fied.
Id. at 424-25. The Board in Silver Bakery then stated that it would dismiss the reinstated
charge only if the equities in the case compelled a dismissal because of the time that
elapsed between the withdrawal of the charge and the reinstatement by the Regional Director. See California Pac. Signs, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 450 (1970); Public Servs. Planning &
Analysis Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 183 (1979).
When a charge is withdrawn pursuant to a non-Board settlement agreement, the Board
has taken the position that a Regional Director cannot reinstate a charge to circumvent the
§ 10(b) time period. See, e.g., Glacier Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 640, 643 (1971);
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The Fifth Circuit adopted the Wallace8 3 test as its guideline
for setting aside a non-Board settlement agreement, thereby establishing a middle ground between its earlier panel decision and the
Sixth Circuit's decisions. The panel decision, albeit a concurring
opinion, did not permit withdrawn charges to be reinstated because the parties to the agreement and the Regional Director were
legally and morally bound to the non-Board settlement agreement. In contrast, the decisions of the Board and the Sixth Circuit
allowed the Regional Director unreviewable discretion to go behind a non-Board settlement agreement and reinstate charges that
were settled previously and withdrawn pursuant to that agreement. For public policy reasons, however, the Fifth Circuit chose
to apply the Wallace test to non-Board settlement agreements.
The Fifth Circuit thought that the Wallace test balanced the national public policy of settling labor disputes by voluntary agreement with the need to assure that non-Board settlement
agreements are not used to impede the Board's implementation of
the Act.
The dissent in Gi/f States8 4 asserted that the test in Wallace
should not apply to a non-Board settlement agreement. The dissent noted that the Regional Director approves only the withdrawal of the charge and that neither the Board nor the Regional
Director is a party to the non-Board settlement agreement." Second, the NLRB Case Handling Manual considers a withdrawal of
a charge to be without prejudice.86 Third, the dissent regarded the
majority opinion as conflicting with section 10(a) of the Act8 7
since the parties, by contractual agreement, had divested the
"Board's function to operate in the public interest. ' 8 Finally, the
dissent cited the Sixth Circuit's decision in Zimnox and the SevKoppers Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 517, 517 (1967). The Board has not specifically stated, however, that the equities will bar a reinstatement of a charge that was voluntarily withdrawn

pursuant to a non-Board settlement agreement after the § 10(b) time period has elapsed.
The Fifth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit do not accept the Board's interpretation of the
sweeping power of the General Counsel to reinstate a charge more than six months from
the date that the alleged unfair labor practice occurred. NLRB v. Silver Bakery, Inc., 351
F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Electric Furnace Co., 327 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1964).
83. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).

84. 598 F.2d at 906-11.
85. Id. at 907.
86. NLRB CASE HANDLING MANUAL, sipra note 6, § 10120.5.

87. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
88. 598 F.2d at 909 (quoting Boire v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 479 F.2d 778,
803 (5th Cir. 1973)).
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enth Circuit's decisions in NLRB v. My Store, Inc.89 and NLRB v.
Rose9" to support the position that the Board has the discretion to

go behind any non-Board settlement agreement. The dissent further objected to the majority's interpretation of Wallace which requires that any subsequent unfair labor practice committed by the
charged party must be related to the non-Board settlement agreement before the Board can go behind the non-Board settlement
agreement and reinstate the charge.
For numerous reasons, the Fifth Circuit's majority opinion
outlines the proper standard for going behind a non-Board settlement agreement. 9 ' Public policy dictates that the parties should
be able to assure themselves that a settlement of the dispute, coupled with a withdrawal of the charge, will finally resolve the issues
presented in the charge if the terms of the non-Board settlement
agreement are not breached and there is no subsequent unfair labor practice committed by the charged party.92 It is untenable
that a charged party could be placed in the same position as the
charged party in Zimnox. The Sixth Circuit in Zimnox acknowledged that the company had neither breached the terms of the
non-Board settlement agreement nor committed any subsequent
unfair labor practices. Despite the absence of such factors, the
court allowed the union to refile the settled charge and use it as a
bludgeon to force the company to agree to certain demands at the
bargaining table. This weapon, however, could be described more
aptly as a double-edged sword. A company could just as easily
refile a charge against a union to obtain concessions at the bargaining table. Neither case, however, promotes harmony between
labor and management--the basic public policy of the Act. In
contrast, the Wallace test represents a well-reasoned middle
ground which gives the parties assurance that the terms of their
agreement will be respected. This test also gives the Regional Di89. 345 F.2d 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 927 (1965).
90. 347 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1965).

91. For a thorough discussion of the proper procedure that the Board should follow
compare Bioff, "Capitulate or Litigate'--The Labor Board's Settlement Policy and the
Objectives of the NationalLabor Relations 4t, 47 U. Mo. KAN. CrrY L. REv. 289 (1979)
with Whipple, "Capitulate or Litigate'-The Labor Board's Settlement Policy and the
Objectives of the NationalLabor RelationsAct-A Reply, 47 U. Mo. KAN. CrTY L. REv.

309 (1979).
92. While an argument can be made that § 10(b) of the Act will cut off the Regional

Director's right to reinstate the charge after six months from the date of the unfair labor
practice, the Board has not accepted this position; thus, the parties to a non-Board settlement agreement remain unsure whether the agreement would, at some point in time, finally
resolve the issues. See note 82 supra.
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rectors and the General Counsel the power to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act by reinstating the withdrawn charge
if the charged party breaches the terms of the agreement or commits a subsequent unfair labor practice.
Notably, the assumption in the NLRB Case Handling Manual
that a withdrawn charge is to be withdrawn without prejudice is
not relevant to a factual setting in which the withdrawal request is
made pursuant to a non-Board settlement agreement that stipulates that the charge is withdrawn with prejudice. The dissent in
6uff States did not recognize this crucial factual distinction. Furthermore, the Board's Trial Examiner in Zimnox, in referring to
counsel's failure to insert the words "with prejudice" in a nonBoard settlement agreement, stated that "[i]f such were in fact the
understanding reached, it is a little difficult to understand why Respondent's counsel, who was present and participated in the discussions, did not insist that such understanding be incorporated in
the consent-election agreement, or otherwise reducedto writing."93
Although there is no question that the Board operates in the
public interest to enforce public, and not private, rights, 94 the majority opinion in Guff States does not conflict with section 10(a) of
the Act. The parties to a non-Board settlement agreement do not
contractually agree to divest the Board of its function to operate in
the public interest. The Regional Director's authority and control
over a case is not usurped when the charging party and the
charged party enter into a non-Board settlement agreement because that Director is not required to agree to the withdrawal of
the charge pursuant to the terms of the agreement. If the Regional
Director determines that the agreement is not in the public's interest, the Director can refuse to allow the charge to be withdrawn
and proceed with the case. The public interest is thereby fully
protected. It is only after the Regional Director agrees that the
charge can be withdrawn that the Wallace restrictions apply to the
power to go behind a non-Board settlement agreement. Under
Wallace, however, the Regional Director is still empowered to go
behind a non-Board settlement agreement if the agreement is
found to be an obvious frustration of the Act's purposes.9 5 There
is no limitation, therefore, on the Board's power under section
93. 140 N.L.R.B. 1229, 1237 n.22 (emphasis added).
94. Amalagamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940);
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
95. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. at 253.
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10(a) of the Act to remedy unfair labor practices in the public
interest.
The dissent in Guff States relied on decisions of the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits. The dissent cited the Sixth Circuit decision in
Zimnox to support its position.96 As authority for its holding in
Zimnox, however, the Sixth Circuit cited Wallace, which denied
the Regional Director's absolute discretion to set aside formal settlement agreements. 97 Prior to Zimnox, the Sixth Circuit in SuperiorTooP had refused to go behind a strike-settlement agreement
to find a violation of the Act when there was no finding that the
charged party had committed a subsequent unfair labor practice.
Thus, in relying on the Sixth Circuit to support its opinion, the
dissent in Gauf States relied on a circuit court with inconsistent
rulings. The dissent99 also relied on dicta in the Seventh Circuit's
decision in NLRB v. My Store, Inc. ,"0 which, like the Sixth Circuit opinion, cited Wallace as authority. The dissent also cited the
Seventh Circuit decision in NLRB v. Rose'01 in which the Regional Director did not approve a withdrawal request and proceeded in the public interest to a hearing on the merits of the
charge. The decision in Rose was proper, but the case bore no
relation to the facts in Guff States.
Finally, the dissent in Gulf States objected to the Fifth Circuit's contention that a subsequent unfair labor practice must be
related to a non-Board settlement agreement before the court will
allow the Regional Director to go behind that agreement to find a
violation of the Act on the earlier charge. The Board, however,
took the position of the majority. In Pacic Maritime Association, 02 the Board held that a subsequent independent violation of
the Act unrelated to the matters and conduct of an informal settlement agreement, did not warrant the setting aside of the informal
settlement agreement. It is reasonable to apply this rule, and not
that of the dissent in Gu/fStates, uniformly to all settlements.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Sixth Circuit's position is that the General Counsel or the
96. 598 F.2d at 908.
97. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

309
598
345
347
192

F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1962).
F.2d at 908.
F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1965).
F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1965).
N.L.R.B. 338 (1971).
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Regional Director always can go behind a non-Board settlement
agreement to reinstate a withdrawn charge. The rationale of the
court is that the Board, as protector of the public interest, is not a
party to the agreement and, therefore, is not restricted by the prerequisites outlined in Wallace governing the revival of charges
withdrawn pursuant to a non-Board settlement agreement.
The Fifth Circuit, however, has adopted the Wallace test
which requires the Board to find that a charged party either
breached the terms of the non-Board settlement agreement or
committed a subsequent unfair labor practice before the Board
can revive a charge that was withdrawn pursuant to such an
agreement. The court's rationale is that the Wallace decision
properly balances the need to assure that non-Board settlement
agreements are not used to impede the Board's implementation of
the Act with the national public policy of settling labor disputes
by voluntary agreement.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in 6u/f States furthers this national public policy by encouraging charged parties to reach final,
non-Board settlement agreements. If the charged parties reach
these agreements expeditiously, they often can obtain the charging
parties' agreement to settle for less than that which the Regional
Directors might have demanded. The charged parties also can
save themselves the costs of negotiations, settlement, and repeated
litigation with the Regional Directors. Thus, the non-Board settlement represents a very attractive alternative to charged parties
in the Fifth Circuit.
The charging parties also benefit from the Fifth Circuit's decision in C6ufStates because they can obtain quick settlements. Not
only do these swift settlements effectuate the purposes and policies
of the Act, but they obviate the unemployed discriminatees' need
for the lengthy negotiation and litigation necessary to obtain reinstatement with back pay. The charging parties find that relinquishing the right to refile their charges if they are dissatisfied
with the terms of their agreements is a fair trade-off for such a
settlement. Although the charging parties might be able to obtain
a more favorable settlement through negotiations with the Regional Directors, the possibility of unsuccessful negotiations or
losing at the hearing makes a settlement more attractive.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in C6uf States also prevents litigation over non-Board settlement agreements unless the charged
parties commit subsequent unfair labor practices that are substantially related to those agreements. This decision, therefore, gives
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finality to the non-Board settlement agreements that comprise a
large portion of the cases settled each year. Thus, the Fifth Circuit helps the Board achieve its goal of effectuating the purposes
and policies of the Act and avoiding the possibility of a crisis
which could result from a significant decrease in the settlement
rate.
The Fifth Circuit also gives the Board freedom to prevent frustration of the Act by allowing the reinstatement of withdrawn
charges under limited circumstances. In this grant of freedom, the
Fifth Circuit evinces its agreement with the policy argument that
without subsequent conduct by a charged party constituting either
a violation of the terms of the agreement or unlawful conduct, the
charged party has some right to expect that the other party will
abide by the terms of the agreement.
In light of the merits of the Fifth Circuit's approach to nonBoard settlement agreements, the Sixth Circuit's approach is not
convincing. In fact, the Sixth Circuit could not have reached its
current position, as articulated in Zimnox and Lasko, without ignoring its earlier decision in Superior Tool. The Sixth Circuit,
therefore, should squarely address the issues and adopt the position of the Fifth Circuit.

